Anti-Trust Law in West Germany: Recent Developments in German and Common Market Regulation by Heil, Paul W. & Vorbrugg, Gerog
PAUL W. HEIL*
GEORG VORBRUGGt
Anti-Trust Law in West Germany:
Recent Developments in German
and Common Market Regulation
I. Introduction
The Federal Republic of Germany possesses the most thorough legal
structure for the assurance of a competitive economic system on the European
continent.1 Many of the statutory components of this intricate and (by
American standards) carefully organized structure date back, in form if not in
substance, to the turn of the century or even to the last century. The Trade
Regulation Act, which sets forth the basic principle that all are free to
participate in the enterprise system, traces its origins back to 1869.2 The Unfair
Trade Practices Act, which attempts to insure that such participation will take
place in accordance with "good morals," was first introduced in 1909. 3
The more purely "anti-trust" aspects (designated as "cartel law" by Germans
and other Europeans) of the structure are of a relatively recent origin, however,
and clearly exhibit the fact that they are drawn from the American model. 4 The
German Act Against Restraints of Competition S originally adopted in 1957,
*LL.B., Univ. of Pennsylvania (1966); member of the Detroit, Michigan Bar; ABA International
Exchange Program Intern with Strobl, Killius & Vorbrugg, Munich, Germany.
tDr. Jur. (1965) and LL.M. (1962), Harvard Univ.; member of the Munich, Germany Bar;
partner, Strobl, Killius & Vorbrugg, Munich, Germany.
'See generally Strobl, Killius & Vorbrugg, German and EEC Competition Law, in CCH
BUSINESS GUIDE TO GERMANY, 117 c. seq.. (CCH 1971), and 2 COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAW, 2nd ed. (Oceana Pub. 1971), 46 et seq., for briefer summaries of German law concerning
economic competition, up to to the time of developments discussed in this article. A more thorough
study in English is 3 BLAKE, ed., BUSINESS REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS: WEST
GERMANY (1969). A convenient one volume, paperback edition of the major West German statutes
dealing with anti-trust and unfair trade practices, in German, is WETTBEWERBSRECHT UND
KARTELLRECHT (Beck-Texte, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1973).
2Trade Regulation Act (Gewerbeordnung), as published (1960) RGB1. 871, as most recently
amended Sept. 7, 1968, (1968) I BGB1. 1065.
3Unfair Trade Practices Act.(Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) of June 7, 1909 (1909)
RGB1. 1 499, as most recently amended June 26, 1969 (1969) BGB1. 1 633.
'See generally 3 BLAKE, supra note 1, at 87-97, and Schwartz, Anti-trust Legislation and Policy
in Germany-A Comparative Study, 105 U. Pa. L. REv. 617 (1957).
I Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen) of July 27,
1957 (1957) BGB1. 1 1081, as republished (1966) BGB1. I 37, as most recently amended August 3,
1973 (1973) BGB1. 1917 (hereinafter cited as GWB and sometimes referred to as the Kartellgesetz).
English translations of the Act and its amendments up to the date of their publication appear in 2
OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, pt. "D" (loose leaf ed.
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has as its objective the preservation of price competition between business
enterprises. 6 The Kartellgesetz, as it is popularly known, more specifically
concerns itself with various restraints affecting price determination (e.g., cartel
agreements, resale price maintenance agreements, licensing agreements, and
the regulation of practices of trade associations) and with the control of
problems created by market size (e.g., abuse of market power, and market
concentration including, recently, merger control). Its philosophy is thus
complementary to the earlier statutes. In addition to this municipal legislation,
the competitive economic system in Germany is also subject to the competition
policies laid down by the emerging legal system of the European Communities,
especially by Articles 85 through 90 of the Treaty of Rome. 7 If the German
anti-trust statute shows signs of its American sources, the EEC rules even more
clearly reflect their debt to the German legislation.
As can easily be understood, this structure is not a static one. The rules of the
EEC, being in their formative years, have been especially dynamic, as anyone
who follows the frequent reports of EEC developments in the American business
press knows. The judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Continental
Can-Europemballage case last February8 and the proposed draft of a Council
Regulation concerning merger control, announced by the Commission in July, 9
were particularly significant events. Less U.S. press coverage has accompanied
the recent adoption in Germany of the 1973 Act amending the Act Against
1966), and 3 BLAKE, supra note 1, at 379-412. A complete English translation of the Act Against
Restraints of Competition, as amended in 1973, printed side by side with the original German text,
became available late in 1973: MUELLER& SCHNEIDER, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRAN-
KUNGEN (KARTELLGESETZ) - THE GERMAN LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION: Bilingual
Edition with Introduction (Fritz Knapp Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1973).
1 The term "enterprise" (Unternehmen) is used frequently in this article and in all discussions
regarding both German and EEC anti-trust law. It is a key continental commercial law concept, but
one which continues to be the subject of scholarly dispute concerning its precise content. For
purposes of this article, the following definition should be sufficient:
[T]he expression "undertaking" . . . or "enterprise" . . . includes any form of business, whether
carried on individually, or by a partnership, or by a commercial or civil company with or without
legal personality ... The characteristic of an enterprise is the existence of some business
organization, simple as this may be, which is implicit in the carrying on of business as
distinguished from the performance of an isolated transaction. Basically it is an economic and
commercial concept but it has acquired in Continental European commercial and fiscal laws a
legal meaning .... A further characteristic of an enterprise is the element of gain. [ZAPHIRIOU,
EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW, 18 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1970).]
'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed at Rome March 25, 1957
(hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty). The quotations used herein are taken from the unofficial English
translation published by the Publishing Services of the European Communities in 1965. Other
English versions of the Treaty are found in 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1151 et. seq. and 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
'Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. E.C. Commission (Case
No. 6/72; European Ct. of Justice Judgment of Feb. 21, 1973), (1973) COMM. MKT. L. R. (Part 68)
199, at 219 (April 1973); 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18171.
'Draft Regulation of the E.C. Council Concerning Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, EEC Comm'n. Doc. Com. (73) 1210 final (18 July 1973), (1973) COMM. MKT. L. R.
D205 (Sept. 1973); 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9586.
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Restraints of Competition. 10 The effective date of that Act was described by one
leading German newspaper, however, as "the beginning of a new epoch in the
competition policy of the Federal Republic." 11
It is the purpose of this article to describe briefly, for the benefit of the
American business lawyer, who is not a specialist in the European anti-trust
field, these developments which have taken place in the area of German and
EEC anti-trust law primarily during the first half of 1973 (with an emphasis on
the new German legislation) and which can be expected to have long-term
effects on American enterprises doing business in Germany.
H. The New Concerted Practices Prohibition
One of the changes introduced into the Kartellgesetz by the 1973 Amending
Act was a specific prohibition of certain "concerted practices," i.e.,
of parallel market behavior. 12 The practical significance of such a prohibition,
as the American anti-trust experience has shown, is open to some question,
largely, of course, because of the great difficulties involved in proving a
violation. The following discussion of the background behind this new
prohibition and its role within the structure of the German Act should,
therefore, not be taken as a sign of the practical importance which the writers
attach to the new provision itself: although it is important, it is substantially less
important than certain other changes introduced by the 1973 amendments. The
significance that the following discussion has in this report lies in its ability to
illustrate the general nature of the Kartellgesetz and German patterns of legal
thought in this area of the law.
The Kartellgesetz, in its structure, constitutes a compromise between three
regulatory concepts: 13
"°Second Act Amending the Act against Restraints of Competition (Zweites Gesetz zur Anderung
des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen) of August 3, 1973 (1973) BGBI. I 917
(hereinafter cited as 1973 Amend. Act or referred to as the 1973 Amending Act). The complete text
of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen with the 1973 Amending Act integrated therein
was published in the August, 1973, issue of WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB, (1973) WuW 537. A
readable and brief summary, in German, of the 1973 amendments and their more significant
consequences is Ebel, Novellierung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen (pts. 1-2),
(1973) NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1577 (Sept. 4, 1973), 1666 (Sept. 18, 1973).
'Die Welt, Aug. 9, 1973, at 7. Orin the words of a German commentator on the 1973 amending
act: "One can describe the 1973 revisions without exaggeration as a new Cartel Law."
Rauschenbach, Die Hauptprobleme der Kartellnovelle fir die Unternehmen und ihre Berater,
(1973) NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1257 (Oct. 16, 1973) at 1257.
'11973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (11); now GWB § 25 (1). The German phrase which is herein
translated as "concerted practice" is "aufeinander abgestimmte Verhaltung," more literally
translatable as "mutually adjusted conduct." For a recent scholarly discussion of the concerted
action problem, with comparisons between U.S., EEC and German law (including the 1973
German amendment), see Axster, Das Verbot des "aufeinander abgestimmten Verhaltens" in § 25
Abs. I der Zweiten Novelle des GWB, (1973) WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 605 (Sept. 1973).
3See generally 3 BLAKE, supra note 1, at 83-99, and 1 Mi1LLER-HENNENBERG AND SCHWARTZ,
eds., GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRXNKUNGEN UND EUROPXISCHEs KARTELLRECHT:
GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR (3rd ed., 1972), for discussions of the historical and political
background of the GWB.
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1. The prohibition principle, where certain activities (such as the making of
certain types of cartel agreements), with minor exceptions, are out-and-out
forbidden;
2. The licensing principle, e.g., where certain cartels are permitted to
function, some only with prior governmental permission and others
without specific prior permission but always subject to the government's
right to enjoin frowned-upon activities; and
3. The supervisory principle, where the anti-trust agency has general
authority to prohibit "abuses" by the regulation of certain business
practices (such as price maintenance and recommendation practices and
the practices of so-called "market-dominating" enterprises).
Section 1 of the Act, which itself was left unchanged by the 1973 amendments,
illustrates the nature of this compromise, which, as will be noticed in the
balance of this article, can be observed throughout the Act. That Section first
states a sweeping prohibition against horizontal agreements in restraint of
trade-and then goes on to limit the scope of that prohibition:
(1) Agreements made for a common purpose by enterprises or associations of
enterprises and decisions of associations of enterprises are of no effect insofar as they
are likely to influence, by restraining competition, production or marketing conditions
with respect to trade in goods or commercial services. This shall apply only insofar as
this Act does not provide otherwise.
(2) The term "decisions of associations of enterprises" shall include decisions of
meetings of the members of a legal person, insofar as such members are enterprises.
Section 1 illustrates another legislative technique important to an
understanding of the Kartellgesetz: it declares certain agreements to be "of no
effect," i.e., to be void. The offenses relating thereto, enumerated later in the
Act, 14 consist in ignoring the lack of effect, the voidness, of such agreements. It
is therefore, at least technically, not the making of certain types of agreements
that the law prohibits, but rather the attempt to treat such agreements as if they
had legal effect. 15
Finally, in reading Section 1 it should be observed that it specifically refers
to "agreements." Herein to date lay the problem in attempting to get at
"concerted practices." Under well-settled concepts of German law, 16 the term
"agreement" (Vertrag) is limited to what American lawyers would describe as
contractual obligations, i. e., understandings which the parties intend to be
'GWB § 38-43.
'"GWB § 38 (1) 1: "An offense is committed by any person who . . . willfully disregards the
ineffectiveness of an agreement or decision arising under Section 1 .. "
'"See discussion in Palandt, BibRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, 32nd ed. (Beck'sche Kurz-Kom-
mentare, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich, 1973), at 121-131 (introduction to Civil
Code's provisions dealing with contractual obligations) and at 194-195 (comment 2 to § 241 of Civil
Code, concerning the obligation to perform contractual duties). See also Willoweit, Rechtsgeschiift
und einverstdndliches Verhalten: Rechtsdogmatische Randbemerkungen zum "Teerfarben"-
Beschluss des BGH vom 17.12. 1970, (1971) NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2045, at 2049.
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enforceable through judicial proceedings. Conscious parallel market behavior
does not involve such an expectation and, therefore, would not be expected to
qualify as an agreement under Section 1 of the Kartellgesetz.
In 1967 the German Federal Cartel Office (the Bundeskartellamt), the
principal authority administering the Kartellgesetz,1 7 imposed fines against
four leading German chemical manufacturers and three individual officers of
those concerns for the alleged concerted raising of prices for aniline dyes, which,
according to the Cartel Office's theory, constituted a violation of Section 1.18
The proceedings which followed in that action, the so-called Teerfarben case,
were among the most carefully followed in the history of the enforcement of the
German anti-trust legislation. The case also had European-wide significance,
since shortly before commencement of the Cartel Office's action the Commission
of the European Communities had also brought an action against these (and
other, non-German) aniline manufacturers for essentially the same set of
facts. 19
Eventually, late in 1970, a decision on the Cartel Office's action was made by
the German Federal Supreme Court. 20 That decision, as had been expected in
legal circles, fully confirmed the orthodox view that concerted practices were not
encompassed by the term agreements and, therefore, were not prohibited by
Section 1. Although legally correct, the decision met with wide public
disapproval in Germany, partially because the decision was contrary to the EEC
result (albeit under different statutory language) 2 1 and partially because
"The regulation activities covered by the Kartellgesetz is usually exercised by the Federal Cartel
Office, located in Berlin, although in some circumstances Land (state) authorities, usually state
ministries of economics, may also exercise jurisdiction.
"Judgment of November 28, 1967, WuW ENTSCHEIDUNGS-SAMMLUNG ZUM KARTELLRECHT
[WuW/E BKartA] 1179 (Bundeskartellamt). German cases referred to in this article are cited to
this collection of decisions (hereinafter cited as "WuW/E," followed by the name of the court or
other deciding authority), published by the journal WIRTSCHAFT UND WETrBEWERB (WUW),
which, although "unofficial," serves as the leading topical reporter of cases in the competition and
trade regulation law field.
"EEC Comm'n Decision of June 24, 1969 (Dyestuff Manufacturers Case), 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. J 9314 (1969); the Commission's proceedings that resulted in this action for the imposition of
fines was commenced on May 31, 1967. When the German Cartel Office action was taken to its
initial appeal against the administrative decision, the manufacturers raised the defense that the
Cartel Office's jurisdiction was preempted by the Commission's action. That issue was then sent by
the German Court to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. In a ruling of major
importance to the "constitutional structure" of the EEC legal order-and to the risk of incurring
substantial fines because of anti-trust law violations committed in Germany-the European court
held that cumulative penalties may be imposed by a domestic court for the violation of the national
statute and by the Commission for violation of the Community anti-trust law because of the same
restrictive agreement or practice. Walt Wilhelm et al. v. Bundeskartellamt, case No. 14/68, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 8056 (1969). An anti-trust violation in Germany (if it may affect trade between
EEC states) is thus subject to a form of double jeopardy. See generally Markert, The Dyestuff Case:
A Contribution to the Relationship Between the Antitrust Laws of the European Economic
Community and Its Member States, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1969).
"Judgment of December 17, 1970 (Teerfarben Decision) WuW/E BGH 1147. (Also found at 24
BGHSt 54.)
"EEC Comm'n Decision of June 24, 1969, supra note 19. The Commission action was based on
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legislative consideration of reform of the Kartellgesetz was already well
underway. 22 To the general public, the area of concerted practices thus
appeared to be an obvious area for reform and both legislators and legal
scholars 23 turned their attention to the issue.
The manner in which the Act was amended to prohibit concerted practices
furnishes yet another example of the statutory structure of the Kartellgesetz.
The normal rule under the Act has been that the competitive behavior of indi-
vidual enterprises (except when resulting from the forbidden types of
agreements or when that behavior constitutes an abuse of a market-dominating
position) is not subject to governmental supervision. The unilateral pursuit of
business objectives, even when that pursuit involves discrimination between
customers or suppliers, has generally not been limited by the statute. The
exceptions to this general principle are collected in Chapter 4 of the Act, 24
which is where the new concerted practices prohibition is also now found. 25
Section 25 (1) of the Act now provides as follows: "A concerted practice by
enterprises or associations of enterprises, which under this Act may not be made
the subject of a contractual obligation, is forbidden." Thus the solution to the
issue of conscious parallel market behavior has been to declare as illegal such
parallel behavior as could not be made the subject of a legally binding
agreement and therefore transfer such behavior into the same realm as
the theory that the repeated and general price increases of the aniline dye manufacturers consisted a
concerted practice within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 85 of the Treaty, which reads: "The
following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby be
prohibited: . . . any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member
States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the Common Market ... ." EEC TREATY, art. 85.
"Prior to 1973, the last major amendment of the Kartellgesetz occurred in 1965 and became
effective on January 1, 1966. Act to Amend the Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz zur
Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrgnkungen), (1965) BGB1. I 1363. Minor
amendments to the Act were made in 1968 and 1969. Almost immediately after the 1965 Amending
Act became effective, the consideration of further changes in the Act, usually on the ground of the
necessity of adjusting the German economy to the increasing requirements of the Common Market,
commenced. Serious work on substantial revision of the Act began in 1967 and the government's bill
for the Second Amending Act was sent to the Bundestag in the Spring of 1971. Draft and Comments
of the Federal Government for a Second Act for the Amendment of the Act Against Restraints of
Competition (Entwurf der Bundesregierung eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Anderung des Gesetzes
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen), BUNDESRATSDRUCKSAC HE 265/71, reprinted in (1971) WuW
531 ff.
Consideration of this Draft was suspended during the German Federal elections in 1972 and was
then resumed in January, 1973. The Draft itself was in the process of being completed when the
Teerfarben decision was handed down in 1970. In January 1973, when consideration of the Bill was
again commenced, the government indicated its willingness to consider additional changes,
particularly in the areas of concerted practices, resale price maintenance, and price recommenda-
tions. See Commerce in Germany, March 1973, at 28. It is in these last-mentioned areas that the
effects of legislative compromise in the 1973 amending act are most obvious.
"See, e.g., ULMER, ABGESTIMMTE VERHALTENSWEISEN IM KARTELLRECHT(Verlag C. F. Muller
1972), for one of the better, relatively brief (49 pp.) discussions of the concerted practices issue
resulting from the Teerfarben case.
"'GWB §§ 25-27.
"GWB § 25 (1), as amended 1973.
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comparable agreements. This is the sort of solution which accords well with the
German legal mind; it brings with great formal logic an oversight into the
purview of previously determined consequences. 
26
The Teerfarben decision has thus been reversed. The insurmountable
problem of having to prove some sort of enforceable agreement, imposing
obligations on the parties thereto, has been eliminated and, although the
practical problems of proving conscious parallelism are not to be minimized,
collusive agreements affecting competition are now clearly illegal under German
law. The Cartel Office is now able to attack such collusive parallel behavior
under substantially lightened evidentiary circumstances.
m. Resale Price Maintenance Rules
A. Abolition of the Price Maintenance
Agreement Register
Of interest to branded-goods manufacturers selling in Germany through a
German distribution network is the fact that the 1973 Amending Act abolished
the resale price maintenance agreement register, formerly kept by the Cartel
Office. 27 As a consequence of this change, effective January 1, 1974, only resale
price maintenance agreements covering publications are allowed.
The Act's provisions governing resale price maintenance agreements again
illustrate the compromise between the regulatory concepts mentioned earlier.
Section 15 (left unchanged by the 1973 amendments) states the Act's general
rule:
Agreements between enterprises with respect to goods or commercial services relating
to markets located within the area to which this Act applies are null and void insofar as
they restrict a party to them in its freedom to determine prices or terms in contracts
which it concludes with third parties in regard to the goods supplied, other goods, or
commercial services.
Section 16, prior to amendment, then followed with an exemption from the
foregoing prohibition for publications and branded goods, provided certain
strict statutory provisions were met. The agreements concerning branded goods
were required to be registered with the Cartel Office; agreements regarding
publications did not (and, under the 1973 amendments, still do not) require
such registration. The other statutory conditions for qualifying for the
exemption were quite similar to the conditions now imposed on resale price
2 Cf Von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the United States and Germany-A Comparative
Analysis, FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST RABEL 67 (1954). The German legal system is greatly concerned
with assuring that the legal consequences of particular behavior is statutorily known beforehand.
This concern is reflected in the concept of the "Rechtsstaat," a concept somewhat akin to the
American due-process doctrine of definiteness, although because of the essentially statutory nature
of the German legal system the former concept plays even a stronger role in the German system
than the latter plays in the American. This concern also is a major distinction between the German
and American anti-trust law structures.
271973 Amend. Act, Art 1 (6); now GWB §§ 16-18, as amended.
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recommendations under the 1973 Amending Act, as discussed below. The
Cartel Office also had supervisory powers over the abuse of resale price
maintenance agreements. 28
Although resale price maintenance systems have played a very large role in
Germany's retail economy 29 -a much larger role than they have in the United
States, where their legality has varied from state to state-they have come under
increasing legal and political attack and, even before the passage of the 1973
Amending Act, the legal effectiveness of practically every resale price
maintenance agreement for branded goods was open to doubt. Changing
patterns of distribution (chiefly the decline of small shops, whose proprietors
appreciated the protection afforded by uniform pricing, and the rise of
supermarkets and discount department stores, whose profits are based more on
large volume than on a high mark-up) probably constitute the fundamental
economic reason for the breakdown of these systems.
The legal protection accorded resale price maintenance agreements, however,
has always existed under "the sword of Damocles," 30 in the form of a
judicially-developed requirement that the system be a completed and closed one
and not leave any, even theoretical, loop-holes for special prices. 3 1 Thus if,
after export, a German branded good could be re-imported into Germany by a
retailer not a party to the applicable price maintenance agreement and sold
there by him at a price different from that specified in the agreement, then the
entire price maintenance system for that good in Germany became legally void.
When in 1966 the European Court of Justice held in the Grundig-Consten case
that prohibitions against re-export in exclusive dealership agreements
contravened Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 32 the sword came clearly into view.
The Federal Cartel Office thereafter increasingly took the position that, because
of the "open EEC flank," branded goods which were exported by German
manufacturers could not be made the subjects of legally protected price
maintenance agreements. In the words of a spokesman for branded goods
2
'GWB § 17. Supervisory powers over the abuse of resale price maintenance agreements covering
publications are still in force after the 1973 amendments.
29As of December 31, 1970, 171,766 different branded items were the subjects of price
maintenance agreements on file with the Cartel Office. Recommended prices were filed for another
297,395 items. 1970 TXTIGKEITSBERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTS at 155. "Since the decision of
the Bundestag to forbid retail price maintenance took effect, increasing numbers of brand
manufacturers are withdrawing their price maintenance registrations with the Cartel Office in
Berlin-or simply not registering in the first place. On August 6, according to the Cartel Office,
there were still 172,526 price maintained articles registered by 751 manufacturers, of which alone
84,438 were for vehicle parts and supplies. A good four weeks later, by the middle of September,
there were 716 manufacturers still registered, with 164,685 articles, of which 84,390 were vehicle
parts." Freese, Durch die Maschen des Gesetzes, Die Zeit, Sept. 21, 1973, at 33.
3 Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 2, 1973.
3 On the doctrine of "Liickenlosigkeit," see generally 2 MULLER-HENNEBERG AND SCHWARTZ,
supra note 13, at ann. to § 16 GWB.32Etablissements Consten v. Societe Union Nationale des Economies Familiales (UNEF),
S.A.R.L., 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8046 (1966).
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manufacturers: "By means of this theory [the Cartel Office] has not only hung
the sword of Damocles over the head of retail price maintenance, it has also let
it fall." 33 The 1973 amendment abolishing Section 16's exemption for price
maintenance agreements for branded goods may, therefore, simply have given
the German system a decent burial. 34
B. Resale Price Recommendation Rules
The repeal of the authorization for price maintenance agreement systems was
accompanied by the legislative introduction of a stricter regulatory regime for
price recommendation systems. 35 Many of the statutory prerequisites which
had previously applied to price maintenance agreements have now been
transferred wholesale, under Section 38a of the revised Act, to price
recommendations.
Prior to the 1973 Amending Act, price recommendations to distributors were
always permissible if it was specified that the recommended price was not
mandatory. Such price recommendations could be registered-and the Cartel
Office took the position that they should be registered 36 -but such registration
(under old Section 16 (4) of the Act) was not a requirement for their validity.
The situation as to the permissibility of price recommendations has been
changed by the 1973 Amending Act Section 38 of the Act (again the basic
prohibitory provision, within the scheme of our earlier reference to the Act's
regulatory principles) was amended to include as offenders against the Act
enumerated therein, one who:
(11) delivers recommendations which result in an evasion through uniform behavior of
a prohibition contained in this Act or a prohibition issued by the Cartel Authorities
pursuant to this Act, or
(12) recommends to the purchasers of his goods that specific prices be directed to or be
offered to or that specific types of price stipulations apply to the further retailing of his
goods.
There again immediately follows, in the new Section 38a, a specific exemption
from the prohibited behavior for:
Non-binding price recommendations by an enterprise for the resale of its branded
goods, which stand in competition with comparable goods of another producer, if:
(a) such recommendations are expressly indicated as non-binding and no economic,
"Statement by Dr. Martino of the German Brand Names Association (Markenverband), quoted
in Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 2, 1973.
"For a discussion of the problems of this example of interaction between EEC and municipal law,
see Ebb, The Grundig-Consten Case Revisited: Judicial Harmonization of NationalLaw and Treaty
Law in the Common Market, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 885 (1967).
311973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (15) & (16); now GWB § 38 as amended & § 38a. A brief German
discussion of the new rules is Bige, Die unverbindliche Preisempfehlungfllr Markenwaren, (1973)
DER BETRIEB 1733 (Sept. 7, 1973).
3
'Bekanntmachungen Nr. 7/66 (Announcement No. 7/66) des Bundeskartellamts, Bundesan-
zeiger, February 9, 1966.
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social or other pressure is applied to effectuate their enforcement, and
(b) the recommended price can be expected to correspond to the price asked by the
majority of the receivers of the recommendations.
The definition of "branded goods," taken over from the old Section 16(2),
includes goods which display a distinctive mark, indicating their origin, and for
which the producer warrants their uniform or improved quality and can include
certain agricultural products, despite minor variations in such products'
quality. 37
The balance of the exemption then goes on to regulate more precisely the
right to make such "non-binding" price recommendations. Specifically, the
Cartel Office is granted the power to declare such recommendations to be an
"abuse" of the exemption, if: 38
(a) they keep prices uneconomically high, prevent them from falling, or restrict the
production or distribution of such goods;
(b) they serve to deceive consumers as to the prices actually charged in the majority of
cases;
(c) they considerably exceed the actual asked prices in the majority of cases; or
(d) specific enterprises or groups of purchasers are discriminated against with respect
to the marketing of such price-recommended goods.
As a practical matter, the Cartel Office itself expects to have great difficulty
exercising these supervisory powers. 39 At least under the prior provisions, price
maintenance agreements and (many) price recommendations were registered
with the Office, giving it some indication of their contents. Under the revised
Act, this will no longer be the case. The new merger control responsibilities will
also sap the limited strength of thie Cartel Office. It therefore hopes for the
assistance of consumer organizations in policing the new price recommenda-
tions systems.
C. Responses to the Abolition of Resale
Price Maintenance
The close connection between the manufacturers of brand name products and
the retailers of those products, especially in connection with pricing decisions,
is, of course, nothing new, nor is it a relationship peculiar to Germany. The
consuming public tends to look to the reputation of the manufacturer much
more than to that of the retailer, from whom it actually purchases the product,
when it purchases a brand name product. The driver of a Ford automobile, for
example, undoubtedly knows who manufactured his car, yet will recall only with
difficulty the name of the dealer who sold it to him. The law has recognized this
consumer expectation in numerous ways, of which the area of product liability is
perhaps the most dramatic example. It should therefore be acknowledged that
"IGWB § 38a (2) (new).
38GWB § 38a (3) (new).
39Handelsblatt, August 9, 1973, at 1.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. 2
Antitrust Law in West Germany
the manufacturers of brand name goods have a legitimate interest in the ways in
which their products are retailed-including the prices at which they are
retailed. The German brand name manufacturers have responded to the repeal
of the price maintenance agreement register, understandably enough, by
seeking alternative methods of retail distribution that continue to permit them
to retain fundamental control over the retail prices of their products. Three
basic methods are available.
First, retail price recommendations may be made. The legal requirements
governing the making of such recommendations have been outlined above.
Many of those branded goods which in Germany were previously marketed
through systems of price maintenance agreements are now gradually being
marketed instead through systems of price recommendations.
The primary legal problem posed by attempting to utilize the price
recommendation device as a substitute for retail price maintenance agreements
is the dilemma posed in the amended Act's resale price recommendation rules
themselves. Under Section 38a, the recommendations must be "non-binding":
it would thus be desirable, from an evidentiary standpoint, if there was some
deviation from the recommendations. Uniform compliance would constitute
evidence that pressure of some sort was being applied to the retailers in violation
of Section 38. Under Section 38a (3)(a), however, it is an abuse of the
exemption if the recommended price deceives consumers as to the actual prices
charged in the majority of cases. Thus, the price-recommending manufacturer
is faced with the almost impossible task of making certain that his
recommendations are followed-but not too much!
In connection with this first alternative to price maintenance agreements, it
should be noted further that the Bundestag, by resolution, has instructed the
government to submit to it a report concerning the consequences of the new
non-binding price recommendations exemption provisions after they have been
in effect for three years. 40 There is a strong belief in Germany that after this
report is received even this exemption for non-binding recommendations will
be legislatively abolished. With this belief goes a desire among many
manufacturers not to tie-in with an alternative that may well be as doomed as
the old resale price maintenance agreements system itself.
A second alternative for the branded goods manufacturer is to enter the retail
market directly through the establishment (or expansion) of manufacturer-
owned retail outlets. This alternative is already an actuality for many
manufacturers in certain industries-particularly in the wearing apparel fields,
where for example, it has long been customary for shoe manufacturers to own
their own chains of retail shoe stores. Although this alternative appears to be
under consideration by a number of manufacturers, it presents insurmountable
1o BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 449/73, dated June 13, 1973.
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administrative control problems to most firms. Even those capable of handling
the administrative problems are also usually deterred from it by the
commitment of long-term capital that it would normally require.
Between the extremes of price recommendation systems and the
establishment of manufacturer-owned retail outlet chains stands the third
alternative, that which appeals to many branded goods manufacturers as the
most practical solution to their new pricing control problem: various forms of
retail "agency" relationships.
The first such relationship (commonly described as a Vertriebsbindung)
involves the use of an agent who transacts business on his own behalf and in his
own name, often carrying on business as a sole distributor of a manufacturer's
products. The agent himself is variously known as a Vertragshindler,
Eigenhdndler, or Konzession~ir. He is, in many ways, the German equivalent of
the American "licensed dealer," and is found, as in America, typically in the
cosmetic field.
A second "agency" relationship involves the so-called Kommissionsagent, a
dealer acting in his own name on a permanent basis for his "principal," thus
forming a part of the latter's sales organization and-even more-the so-called
Handelsvertreter, a commercial agent or sales representative acting on behalf
and in the name of the principal.
It has been traditional doctrine that pricing instructions from a principal to
agents are exempt from Sections 15, 16 and 18 of the Kartellgesetz, on the
grounds that the restraints normally prohibited by those sections are essential
elements of agency relationships, protected by the German Civil and
Commercial Codes. 4 1
For some time Daimler-Benz has marketed the Mercedes in Germany
through dealerships which have had the legal status of Kommissionsagenten:
i.e., orders are taken for the account of the manufacturer-at prices set by
him-rather than for that of the dealer. The dealer's profit then takes the form
of a commission. With the end to retail price maintenance agreement systems
approaching, other automobile manufacturers, which had relied on the latter
system, have now also considered making their dealers commission agents. That
alternative is logically suited to the sale of more expensive goods and avoids the
capital commitment difficulties of establishing a network of "factory-owned"
outlets.
"2 M13LLER-HENNEBERG AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at ann. 22-24 to § 15 GWB (pp. 24-27).
It should be further noted that restrictive agreements with true commerical agents (including
Handelsvertreter], who do not bear any of the economic risks of their selling activities, are also
exempt from Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits agreements which prevent, restrict or
distort competition within the Common Market. The relationship between principal and agent is
regarded as not being "between enterprises" within the meaning of that Article. See EEC
Commission, Official Notice on Contracts for Exclusive Representation Concluded with
Commercial Agents, Dec. 24, 1962, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 2697.
International Lawyer. Vol. 8. No. 2
Antitrust Law in West Germany
The Federal Cartel Office, however, has indicated its displeasure at this
prospect and, in a September warning addressed primarily to Volkswagen,
stated that it would regard such a "conversion" as an attempt to evade the
revised Act's prohibition against resale price maintenance agreements. The
Cartel Office's dispute with VW was founded on the theory that the proposed
conversion would constitute an abuse of a market-dominating position under
Section 22 of the Kartellgesetz, in that the price competition expected by the
Bundestag on the dealer level following the repeal of the retail price
maintenance provisions would be defeated. Secondarily, the Office took the
position that, as some of the dealers were opposed to the conversion, its
imposition on them would also constitute a discriminatory practice by a
market-dominating enterprise, in contravention of Section 26 (2). Following a
series of conferences between representatives of the Cartel Office and VW, the
latter bowed to the threats of administrative action by the former and
abandoned its conversion plan, at least temporarily. 42
Another, albeit substantially smaller, German automobile manufacturer,
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW), has, to date, achieved more success
with its comparable dealer conversion proposal. BMW submitted its proposed
standard Vertriebsbindung agreement to the EEC Commission for either
negative clearance or exemption under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, which
generally prohibits agreements restricting competition. Because of the current
general importance of the issues involved in this sort of agency relationship, the
Commission seized. upon the BMW application as its opportunity to rule
thereon, at least for purposes of the automobile industry. In November, 1973,
reportedly following appropriate consultation with the West German anti-trust
authorities, the Commission issued a preliminary ruling, essentially approving
the exclusive licensed agency concept for the automobile industry. 43 In that
ruling, the Commission holds that the restrictions on competition caused by
such a relationship are outweighed by protection and security thereby afforded
to consumers, so as to justify an exemption from Article 85's general
prohibition. The importance of this protection and security relative to the sales
and servicing of automobiles was emphasized by the ruling, which leaves open
questions relating to the validity of this type of marketing system for other types
of products (e.g., cosmetics, televisions and household appliances). A key
provision of BMW's proposed standard dealer agreement is the restriction and
protection of each dealer's sales territory-a restriction which obviously has
significant consequences for price competition. The BMW agreement and the
Commission's handling of it are strikingly comparable to the approval of
'2Press Release of the Federal Cartel Office of October 15, 1973, "Umstellung des
Vertriebssystems durch Volkswagenwerk," [1973] WuW 745-746 (Nov. 1973).
"
3Chancenfllr den BMW-Mustervertrag, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 22, 1973.
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territorial restrictions granted in the U.S. Supreme Court's White Motor
case.44
The EEC ruling on the BMW standard dealer agreement might very well be a
substantial "breakthrough" that could determine the nature of the marketing
systems for at least higher-priced consumer goods in Germany in the future.
Although not a total replacement for retail price maintenance, assignment of
exclusive dealership territories could solve many of the marketing control
problems presently seen by many brand-name manufacturers, and probably
most of those with the highest sales volume.
The long-range consequences of the recent statutory changes in the area of
resale prices maintenance rules for Germany's retail trade-and especially for
its economy of small shops dealing mostly in the lower-priced branded goods-
must be awaited before judgment on the changes can be rendered. The
network of small, independent branded goods shops has played a significant
role in the economic history of modern Germany. The owners of those shops and
the manufacturers who have served them, as might be expected, fear the worst.
They believe that the statutory changes in this area may spell their end and
mean the final triumph of the newer mass-marketing system, represented by the
supermarkets and the discount department stores.
IV. Controls Over the Abuse and Achievement
of Market Power
A. Historical Background
Since its enactment in 1957, the Kartellgesetz has focused itself on its
prohibitory regulatory principle (with a complementary emphasis on the
licensing principle), rather than on its supervisory aspects. This has been, of
course, a matter of emphasizing one of the aspects of its compromise structure
over the others. But the emphasis has been more than accidental. Part of this
focus has resulted from the previously mentioned German desire for legal
certainty: there is more apparent certainty in prohibition and licensing
principles than there is in that of supervising abuses. This focus has
furthermore been the product of the post-war political and economic
environment out of which the Act initially emerged. 45
While the principle of prohibition still plays an important role in the Act's
total structure (and in some ways has been strengthened, for example through
the outright prohibition of resale price maintenance agreements), it is the
principle of regulating abuses caused by market imperfections within the
economic system that has been emphasized by the 1973 Amending Act. This
legislative shift of emphasis can be most clearly seen in the two related areas of
"The White Motor Co. v. U.S., 373 U.S. 252, 83 S.Ct. 696 (1963).
"See generally 3 BLAKE, supra note 1, at 83-99.
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the Act to which we now turn: the provisions affecting so-called "market-
dominating" enterprises 46 and those concerning the concentration of
enterprises through mergers and acquisitions. 4 7
Before we deal with the actual statutory changes and innovations in these two
areas, however, a brief digression into the historical aims of the Kartellgesetz
and into the changes that have affected German society and, as a consequence,
the objectives of the 1973 Amending Act will be helpful in illuminating these
developments.
Prior to the 1973 Amending Act, the Federal Cartel Office had limited
powers to prevent the abuse of market power resulting from a market-
dominating or monopoly position. 48 It possessed no power, however, to prevent
a firm from obtaining such a position through mergers or acquisitions. The Act
did require that mergers or acquisitions of a specified size be reported to the
Cartel Office, but it lacked authority to prevent the achievement of the
concentration itself. 4
9
The relative weakness of these prior regulatory provisions reflected the "anti-
cartel" nature of the concerns of the authors of the original Act. The European
cartel developed in the last decades of the nineteenth century out of economic
conditions similar to those which in America gave rise to the trust. The
European cartel and the old-fashioned American trust are essentially the same
genus. Both terms conjure up images of Judge Gary of U.S. Steel (or his
German counterpart) sitting at his dinner table with his competitors, dividing
up markets and protecting price margins. In addition to its strong connotative
overtones, the term cartel does retain a denotative meaning: it is a
"combination of economic enterprises [usually achieved through means of a
specific agreement] of the same economic level (i.e., a horizontal agreement),
for the purpose of exercising control (through elimination or reduction) of
competition."so The cartel - and the trust - is, in short, an economic
institution of a contractual nature through which a number of allegedly
competitive enterprises attempt to protect their own continued survival through
the collusive maintenance of prices and other aspects of their competitive
environment, usually to the consumer's detriment.
While the American trust evoked a relatively quick negative response from
the Populist feelings of the late nineteenth century, resulting in a relatively long
history of American governmental anti-trust activity, the German response to
the cartel was quite different. Germans were accustomed to enterpreneurial
cooperation. The middle class viewed the institution of the cartel as protection
:'1973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (8), now GWB § 22, as amended.
'1973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (9) now GWB §§ 23-24, as amended.
"IGWB § 22, prior to 1973 amendments.
'GWB §§ 23-23, prior to 1973 amendments.
"CREIFELDS, RECHTSWORTERBUCH 574 (C.H. Beck 1968).
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against "cut-throat" competition and against the big unitary industrial
enterprises. Others saw it as a simple extension of the concepts of agricultural
and small-trade cooperatives. Even the industrial proletariat in Germany
(which in America accepted the Populist views of the evil nature of the trust)
accepted cartels as being a stage of capitalism that had to be tolerated until the
industrial system could be revolutionized. Since Germany in modern times has
always been a nation heavily dependent upon foreign trade, the country
furthermore generally felt that the dangers posed by cartel agreements were
offset by the need to be competitive in foreign markets and by the competition
offered within Germany itself by foreign firms. From a jurisprudential
standpoint, the doctrine of freedom of contract (Vertragsfreiheit) also played a
significant role in preventing the enactment of anticartel legislation. Cartels
were viewed by most legal scholars as simple exercises of the right to enter into
contractual obligations. 51 Finally, the ideas of economic autarchy resulting
from the isolation imposed by two major wars and through the ideology of the
Third Reich encouraged the cooperation between nominally competitive
enterprises.
Following the Second World War, with the encouragement of the Western
Allies, a reaction to the cartel system established itself in the new Federal
Republic of Germany. 52 Under the philosophical and administrative economic
leadership of Professor Ludwig Erhard and the government of the Christian
Democratic Party, the free play of competition, maintained and regulated in the
public interest, came to be regarded as the most efficient and democratic road
to German economic recovery. 53 For different philosophical reasons, the Social
Democratic Party, then in opposition, but hostile to massive economic power in
private hands, accepted (albeit occasionally with reluctance) this general thesis
and the philosophy of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft became the economic theory
of the post-war recovery.
It was the philosophy which inspired the dominant regulatory principles of
the original Kartellgesetz. As an economic theory it basically favored the free
play of economic forces, subject only to certain clearly defined limits.
Agreements which restricted that free play were undesirable and were to be
prohibited. 54 But the limits to free play were also to be clearly set forth in the
"The question of the constitutionality of Section 2 GWB, under the provision of Article 2 of the
Basic Law [Grundgesetz] guaranteeing freedom of contract, has been raised even in recent years.
See Benisch, Ist das Kartellverbot grundgesetzwidrig?, 9 DER BETRIEB 37 (1956).
"
2 The American, British and French military governments all had enacted essentially similar
Decartelization Ordinances for their respective Zones in 1947. These provisions remained in effect
until the GWB came into force in 1957. See 3 BLAKE, supra note 1, at 95-97.
"See ERHARD, DEUTSCHLANDS RUCKKEHR ZUM WELTMARKT (Econ-Verlag 1953) for one Prof.
Erhard's formulations of the "neo-liberal" economic philosophy of the Soziale Marktwirtschafl.
'See Explanatory Memorandum to the Government Bill for the Act Against Restraints of
Competition (Begrllndung zum Regierungsentwurf), BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 1138 (1958),
reprinted in MULLER-HENNEBERG AND SCHWARTZ, GESETZ GEGEN WETrBEWERBSBESCHRXN-
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statute, so that they could be easily known by business enterprises and, when
violated, prosecuted in accordance with traditional concepts of criminal
prosecution and "due process" (Rechtsstaatsprinzip).
Germany's economic recovery from the Second World War has, however, now
been an accomplished fact for more than a decade. Since the end of the recovery
period, the Social Democratic Party has replaced the Christian Democratic
Party as the parliamentary majority. The goal of economic efficiency, associated
with the need to provide society with its necessities at the best (and, therefore,
most competitive) price, has been replaced by a goal of smoothing some of the
rough edges from the economic facts of life. Competition itself is increasingly
seen from the standpoint of the world market and defined from within the
framework of the European Common Market. Threats to the individual's
economic freedom are more and more perceived as coming from ever-larger
units of economic endeavor. All of these circumstances, according to prevailing
public opinion, require a higher degree of "fine tuning" of the economy by the
government: in short, what is seen as needed now is a greater degree of
supervisory regulation.
These political and economic developments and changing attitudes are
reflected in the 1973 Amending Act-especially in the shift from a prohibitory
to a supervisory concept of regulation. In the words of the Government's
message accompanying the 1972 draft of the Amending Act:
Competition policy problem number one today is no longer one of "cartelization," but
instead is one of the concentration of business enterprises. As a means for the
realization of economic and technical progress, merger agreements are often
necessary. At the same time, however, the necessity has grown for public competition
policies that prevent excessive concentration and achieve effective controls over
market-dominating power.55
B. Regulation of Market-Dominating
Enterprises
"Market-dominating" ("marktbeherrschend") is the classificatory concept
used by the Kartellgesetz to regulate the exercise of market power. A finding
that an enterprise is market-dominating or in a market-dominating position
subjects that firm to possible regulatory consequences for the abusive exercise of
its market power that a non-market-dominating firm normally need not fear.
More specifically, the cartel authorities may step in to prohibit abusive
KUNGEN: GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR 1149 (1st ed. 1958). The initial CDU govermnent draft of
the GWB was even much more oriented towards a philosophy of prohibition than the eventual Act
turned out to be. The licensing concepts can be thought of as a compromise in favor of the
Federation of German Industries and the supervisory concepts as one in favor of the Social
Democratic Party.
"
5Explanatory Memorandum to the Government Bill for the Second Act Amending the Act
Against Restraints of Competition (Begr~indung zum Regierungsentwurt), BUNDESRATSDRUCK-
SACHE 265/71, (1971) WuW 531, 544.
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conduct by a market-dominating enterprise under the supervisory powers
granted to it in Section 22 (4) and (5) of the amended Act. The question of what
constitutes such "abusive conduct" as is subject to these supervisory powers is
not answered by the Kartellgesetz itself. Examples of abuses which have been
subject to injunction by the Cartel Office include tying contracts, large profit
margins, and long-term leases and conditions of use. The broad test for whether
such terms are abusive is whether they could otherwise be obtained in a "fair-
bargaining" situation. 56 The administrative discretion permitted in the
determination of abusive conduct by a market-dominating firm is very high, as
the current actions by the Cartel Office discussed below illustrate, and this
supervisory authority resulting from a finding of market-domination is therefore
generally regarded by business interests a severe consequence.
Particularly interesting-and controversial-at the moment are efforts to
utilize the market-power abuse provision of Section 22 as an instrument of
government economic stabilization policy. Two current actions by the Federal
Cartel Office illustrate these efforts. One, directed against Braun AG, the
manufacturer of (among other things) the very popular electric shaver, has
resulted in a significant public discussion over the objectives of this provision ' of
German anti-trust law. The second, directed against the major oil companies,
has the same policy implications as the first, but in forms even more intensified
by popular emotions. Both cases illustrate the close relationship that current
economic problems-in these cases, the disturbing rate of inflation that is
affecting the major industrial nations and the "energy crisis"-can have to the
enforcement of anti-trust law. Both also serve to illustrate the expansive role
that the Cartel Office sees for itself under the supervisory power of Section 22.
Shortly after the legislative repeal of authorization for resale price
maintenance agreements, Braun AG, which had had several disputes with the
cartel authorities during the preceding year over its pricing policies,
announced that it was terminating all such agreements which it had with its
retail distributors. Thereafter it further announced an increase in the domestic
wholesale price of its electric shavers. The Federal Cartel Office responded to
the latter move by instituting an administrative action against Braun, on the
theory that Braun was abusing its dominant position in the electric shaver
market through the price increase. The Office requested information from
Braun regarding its pricing practices, including details concerning unit costs,
gross profit per unit, and expenditures for advertising and sales promotion.
Almost immediately after news of "the Braun case" became public, it focused
attention of the German business community on the issue of the extent to which
5 See Explanatory Memorandum to Government Bill (1955), supra note 54. Abuses regarding
prices and conditions were described by the message accompanying the Draft as those which "differ
considerably from those which would be, had effective competition existed and for which no
economic justification exists." Id., at 1092.
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the Cartel Office' has a price control function under the supervisory power
granted to it by Section 22. Public criticism of the Cartel Office's action against
Braun was led by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, one of Germany's
leading newspapers and probably the most respected, in terms of its reporting of
business and economic news.57 The essence of that criticism is that the price
control action implied by the Braun case is not sanctioned by the purpose of the
Kartellgesetz and that the use of that Act as a means of "holding down" prices,
by requiring a manufacturer to justify his pricing on the basis of his costs,
represents an undesirable departure from the spirit of Germany's post-war
economic and social order. In this view, the Braun case perverts the
Kartellgesetz, by shifting its function from the protection and encouragement of
private enterprise to the assurance of "fair" prices, as determined primarily
from a cost accounting standpoint.
The FrankfiurterAllgemeine's criticism did not go unnoticed by the personnel
of the Federal Cartel Office. In a two-part response thereto, Dr. Kurt Markert,
director of the Office's division responsible for the Braun case, defined and
defended the Office's price control theory under Section 22.58 Therein, Dr.
Markert expresses the view that "abusive is any conduct of a
market-dominating enterprise that leads to market consequences, which would
not have been achieved, measured by a degree of probability bordering on
certainty, under conditions of substantial competition." Applying this premise,
he concludes that the Cartel Office is statutorily justified in controlling the
prices of market-dominating enterprises, at least to the extent of keeping them
at a level which would have prevailed, had substantial competition existed. The
requests for cost accounting information, furthermore, were relevant in the
Braun case, if for no other reason than that Braun had publicly stated that its
price increases were made necessary by its increased costs. Dr. Markert believes
that "where the State . . . passively accepts a condition of ineffective
competition (e.g., market-dominating enterprises), it should substitute a State
control [mechanism] in the place of the unavailable control through
competition." This position, Dr. Markert maintains, is supported by both the
language and the legislative history of the Kartellgesetz.
The consequence of this argument is that, where the competitive price
mechanism is unavailable to protect the consumer, a regulatory price system,
imposed by the government, must be instituted. What emerges from this
consequence is a regulatory system requiring price justification by all
market-dominating enterprises-a system comparable to that imposed upon
"See especially Das Kartellamt ist kein Preiskommissar, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov.
19, 1973.
5 Market Das Bundeskartellamt darfPreise kontrollieren, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec.
19, 1973, at 21, and Die Frage nach den Kosten ist nicht gdinzlich irrelevant, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 20, 1973, at 15.
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public utilities and other regulated industries in the United States. 59
Following on the heels of the Braun case, in December, 1973, the Federal
Cartel Office, presumedly responding to public pressure to "do something"
about the gasoline price increases that accompanied the beginning of the
"energy crisis," commenced an investigation of the pricing policies of the major
oil companies. As in the Braun case, the Office issued requests for cost and
price information to eleven oil producers as well as to sixteen importers. The
theoretical justification for the oil price investigation also rests on the same
grounds as the case against Braun.60
This is the second time within a five-year period that the Cartel Office has
initiated action against the oil industry. When gasoline prices failed to return to
their previous levels after resolution of the 1967 Middle East conflict, after
supplies had returned to their pre-conflict levels, the Office instituted its first
action against the companies, as joint market-dominating enterprises, for
abusive pricing conduct under Section 22. (The Cartel Office, as a matter of
fact, now refers to its 1967 action against the oil companies as precedent for its
position in the Braun case.) The obvious intent of the 1967 case was to compel
the oil companies to lower their retail prices. The action succeeded in that
respect, in that, as a consequence of the investigation, the companies
subsequently "voluntarily" reduced their prices and the action was
discontinued. 61 Whether the 1973 investigation can also achieve a similar
desired effect is doubtful. Since the "oil crisis" is a worldwide phenomenon, it is
more likely that compulsory lower prices in West Germany would only serve to
divert oil to other, higher bidding, nations. The German Federal Government
appears to be well aware of that possibility and the 1973 action against the oil
companies may be as much for consumer "show" as for effective price
regulation. 62 Should that be the case, the oil case is an illustration of the
demagogic dangers involved in attempting to utilize the Kartellgesetz as an
instrument of stabilization policy, especially under conditions of economic and
political pressure.
In addition to control over the exercise of market power by dominating
enterprises, such firms are further circumscribed in their ability to expand by
the new merger control provisions outlined below.
The 1973 Amending Act has substantially increased the control that the
Federal Cartel Office can exercise over such market-dominating enterprises. 63
This has been accomplished through a revision of the definition of
"Compare Market's arguments with the analysis of GALBRAITH, THE INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
"For a discussion of the 1973 action against the oil companies, see Eglau, Zum Nichstun
verdammt, Die Zeit, Dec. 21, 1973, at 25.
'1967 TATIGKEITSBERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTS at 41.
2See Eglau,op.cit., note 60.
"1973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (8), (12), and (15), now GWB § 22, § 26 and § 38 (1) (8), respectively,
as amended.
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"market-domination," by the application of certain prohibitions normally
applicable to only market-dominating enterprises to certain other firms, and by
the broadening of the Cartel Office's power to levy fines.
1. NEW DEFINITION OF MARKET-DOMINATION
The Act now defines an enterprise as "market-dominating" insofar as it (a) is
without substantial competition in the relevant market, or (b) is in a
"paramount" ("iiberragende") market position in relation to its competitors,
considering relevant factors regarding both the enterprise and the structure of
the market. 64
The definition obviously presents a great many issues which are subject to
diverse conclusions. The first alternative test of market-domination has been in
the Act since 1957 and its meaning, although fluid, has assumed denotative
content for Kartellrecht practitioners. It involves two determinations, both of
which are also familiar, at least as to the general nature of their problems, to
American lawyers: the identification of the relevant market and a determination
of the existence or non-existence of substantial competition. As to determining
the relevant market, it should be noted that, under the first test, a diversified
enterprise could be market-dominating in one product market but not in others.
The inclusion of the second alternative test by the 1973 Amending Act makes
such separate determinations more difficult, but still logically possible.
Generally, according to the Cartel Office, market determination is made
"according to the function exchangeability of the products offered and
demanded on the market." 65 (The Office does have a tendency to narrow a
market, however, as far as substitute products are concerned.) The
determination of the existence or lack of substantial competition within a
market, as in the United States, is generally made with regard to the economic
theory of "workable competition.", 66
The second alternative test of market-domination, that relating to enterprises
in a "paramount market position," is new with the 1973 Amending Act. 67 In
11 GWB § 2 (1), as amended:
An enterprise is market-dominating within the meaning of this Act insofar as it, as the vendor or
vendee of a particular type of goods or commercial services, (1) is without competition or without
substantial competition, or (2) holds a paramount market position in relation to its competitors.
In addition to its market share, the following factors are to be considered (in determining whether
an enterprise holds a paramount market position): the enterprise's financial power, its access to
the supply and distribution markets, its affiliations with other enterpirses, as well as the legal or
actual restrictions imposed upon other enterprises on entry into the market. See generally
Kn*dpfle, Die marktbeherrschende Stellung nach der Neufassung des § 22 GWB, 26 DER
BETRIEBSBERATER 1177 (Sept. 20, 1973), for an excellent discussion of the revised definition of
market-domination, especially (at 1177-1179) relating to the new paramount market position
clause.
IOpinion of the Federal Cartel Office of August 11, 1961, Wuw/E BKartA 425, at 427.
"See generally the watershed formulation of J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable
Competition, 30 AM. EcON. Rav. 241 (1940).
61973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (8), now GWB § 22 (1) (2), cited supra note 64.
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determining whether an enterprise occupies a "paramount" position, the Act
now calls for the consideration of characteristics in addition to competition
within a specific market: financial strength, access to supply or distribution
resources, and affiliation with other enterprises of the enterprise in question are
to be considered, as well as the legal or actual barriers to entry into the market
by other enterprises.
The relative vagueness of the term "paramount" (despite the statutorily
specified tests) constitutes a significant further extension of the concept of
supervisory regulation in the Kartellgesetz-and, to the opponents of this trend,
the introduction of additional "indefinite legal categories." 68 Whether the fears
reflected in this correct observation will also turn out to be correct remains to be
seen.
As was the case prior to the 1973 amendments, Section 22 (2) of the Act
declares two or more enterprises to be jointly market-dominating where an
oligopolistic situation exists. Thus, each such firm can be treated as
market-dominating where there is no substantial competition between them and
where there is no substantial or only minimal outside competition.
The 1973 amendments introduce several significant presumptions regarding
market-domination: 6 9
(1) A single enterprise is deemed to be market-dominating when it controls one-third
(1/3) or more of a market and has annual sales of more than DM 250 million.
(2) Three or fewer enterprises together are deemed to be market-dominating when they
together have one-half (1/2) or more of the market, except as to such enterprises with
annual sales of less than DM 100 million.
(3) Five or fewer enterprises are deemed to be market-dominating when they together
have two-thirds (2/3) or more of the market, except as to such enterprises with annual
sales of less than DM 100 million.
It is not yet totally clear whether the presumptions under (2) and (3) will apply
to the other enterprises in their "group," where one of the enterprises involved
lacks the required annual sales. These are only presumptions, however, and, as
such, may be rebutted by evidence by the allegedly market-dominating
enterprises. Market-domination may, however, also be found to exist even in
the absence of the presumptive criteria, which, again, serve primarily to
strengthen the hand of the Cartel Office in supervising the activities of firms in
oligopolistic markets.
2. RESTRICTIONS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
As previously explained, the German Act does not generally prohibit
"discriminatory" business practices. The significant exceptions to this rule are
such discrimination which has as its purpose an object which, if made the subject
"Poeche, Bilanz der Kartellnovelle: Dirigistische Anastzpunkte unverkennbar, MARKTWIRT-
SCHAFT, August 1973, 24 at 25.
"1973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (8), now GWB § 22 (3), as amended.
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of an agreement, would violate some provision of the Kartellgesetz (e.g., certain
concerted practices and non-exempted resale price maintenance recommen-
dations).
Subsection 1 of Section 26 of the Act, which sets forth one of these specific
prohibited discriminatory abuses, has been amended to strengthen its
prohibition against the "inducement" of other firms to refuse to sell to or
purchase from third firms, with the intention of unfairly harming the
"inducing" firm's competitor. This practice is defined as a boycott under
German law. The prior language of Section 26 (1) had used the term "to
induce," while the 1973 Amending Act has substituted therefore "to ask,"
thereby making illegal the mere unilateral act of requesting another to sever
relations or refuse to deal with the third party, regardless of the other's response
to that request.
Subsection 2 of Section 26 was also amended. As in the past, it initially
provides that:
Market-dominating enterprises ... shall not unfairly hinder, directly or indirectly,
another enterprise in business activities which are usually open to similar enterprises
nor, in the absence of circumstances justifying- such discrimination, treat such
enterprise, directly or indirectly, in a manner different from the treatment accorded to
similar enterprises.
The amendment of Section 26 (2) involved an extension of this "non-
discrimination" provision to other enterprises, in addition to market-
dominating enterprises, to the extent that their customers or suppliers have no
"reasonable possibilities to switch to -competitors." For purposes of
discriminatory practices, therefore, what might be described as a lesser degree
of "market-domination," which is easier to establish probatively, is sufficient to
justify intervention by the cartel authorities.
3. INCREASED AUTHORITY TO LEVY FINES
In addition to the supervisory authority granted by Section 22 to the Cartel
Office to prohibit the abuse of dominant positions and to invalidate abusive
contracts, the Act since the 1973 amendments now further provides that a
person who willfully violates the discrimination prohibitions contained in
Sections 25 and 26 shall be liable for a fine which may be as high as DM
100,000.70 This again strengthens the hand of the government in dealing with
the abuse of market power.
The truly new set of consequences resulting from being in a
market-dominating position relates to the Cartel Office's new powers to control
mergers. Mergers which result in market-dominating positions or which
strengthen already existing positions are, under the 1973 Amending Act, to be
prohibited.
o 1973 Amend. Act. Art. 1 (15), now GWB § 38 (1) (8), as amended.
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C. Merger Control
Probably the most significant change in the Cartel Act in 1973 is the
enactment of new provisions designed to achieve effective government control
over mergers and other "concentrations of enterprises." Although there is an
area of legal uncertainty about what constitutes a "completed" merger, the new
merger control provisions, by the terms of the Amending Act, apply to all
mergers not completed before June 7, 1973. 71 As a general proposition, then,
these new merger control provisions are now in effect.
The lack of legal power to systematically control the concentration of market
power, either under domestic German law or under the anti-trust rules of the
EEC, has been the subject of lively intellectual debate in Germany for two
decades. 72 The original government bill for the Kartellgesetz had already
emphasized the lack of symmetry in enacting a statute which attempted to
control cartel agreements between nominally competitive enterprises but which
did nothing to control the concentration of power within the hands of a single
economic unit. 73 When the Act was adopted in 1957 the government's original
proposal of a requirement that major mergers be first "validated" by the Cartel
Office was rejected, on the grounds that such a validation system would prevent
the rationalization that was then deemed necessary for the German economy 74
and a merger reporting provision, which still forms the core of the Act's merger
provisions, was adopted instead. 75 In 1964 the Social Democratic Party, then
still in opposition, also proposed measures regarding merger control for
inclusion in the 1965 Amending Act, which were not adopted. 76
The attitude towards mergers and large concentrations of economic power in
Germany-it might as easily be said in Europe and throughout the world-has
grown substantially more negative in the past few years. 77 It is therefore
"1973 Amend. Act, Art. 4 (1). The "completion" of a "merger" involves complex questions
under German law relating to (in American terminology) the transfer of title to goods or securities,
the physical delivery thereof, and the effective date of contractual obligations. For a discussion in
German of some of these questions as they relate to the applicability of the merger control
provisions, see Dl;rinkel & Kermer, Zur Anwendung der Fusionskontrolle ab 7. Juni 1973.
11973] DER BETRIEB 1285 (July 6, 1973).
A German outline commentary on the 1973 Amending Act's merger control provisions in
general is Rdhling, Die Fusionskontrolle nach dem neuen Kartellgesetz, (1973) DER BETRIEB 1585
(Aug. 17. 1973).
"Recent German literature discussing the questions involved in merger control, both in the
German and EEC context, is voluminous. A relatively brief discussion, which includes a selection of
alternative statutory proposals and a discussion of the economic problems, is KLAUE et al., ZUR
PROBLEMATIK DER FUSIONSKONTROLLE (Athen'ium Verlag 1971).
"See Explanatory Memorandum to Government Bill (1955), supra note 54, at 1167.
"See Report of Economic Committee on Bill Against Restraints of Competition, June 22, 1957
(Schriftlicher Bericht des Bundestagsausschusses ffir Wirtschaftspolitik), BUNDESTAGSDRUCK-
SACHE 3644, cited in MULLER-HENNEBERG AND SCHWARTZ, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBS-
BESCHRXNKUNGEN: GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR, § 18, 1191 (1st. ed., 1958).
7SGWB § 23, both prior to and after the 1973 amendments.
"BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE IV/.2337.
"See e.g., above at note 55; Michael Jungblut, Hexenjagd aufMultinationale, Die Zeit, August
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probably no accident that 1973 has seen the introduction of merger control
provisions in Germany and the first serious attempts towards their adoption in
the entire European Economic Community, but rather a part of a larger trend
towards the circumscription of large concentrations of private capital.
The Act as amended does not forbid all mergers, but only those which would
create or strengthen a market-dominating position. Its effects on possible
acquisitions by multinational firms, however, is expected to be very great, since
such firms or their subsidiaries will very frequently be in such a market-
dominating position or be of such a size to make a possible merger a prohibited
one. American firms operating in Germany tend frequently to be one of two
basic types. 78 Many of them are subsidiaries of giant multinational
corporations and as such could conceivably be considered to hold "paramount"
market positions under the revised definition of market-dominating enterprises.
Another very large group are producers or distributors of products that are the
result of high technology research and development work in the United States.
Depending upon how narrowly their respective marketg are defined to be, they
can be held to be holders of large market percentages. Both of these types of
American firms are, therefore, vulnerable to the merger control provisions of
the revised Kartellgesetz.
1. NEW DEFINITION OF MERGER
The Kartellgesetz, as revised by the 1973 Amending Act, defines the term
"merger" or "concentration" (in German "Zusammenschluss") very broadly.
Specifically included within the definition, set forth in subsection 2 of Section
23, are:
(1) Acquisitions of either all or a significant part of the assets of another enterprise,
either through a formal merger with that enterprise, through reorganization, or
through other means.
(2) Acquisitions of an equity interest in another if such interest, either alone or in
connection with other interests already held by the acquiring enterprise:
(a) amounts to the achievement of 25% of the acquired enterprise's voting capital;
(b) amounts to the achievement of 50% of the acquired enterprise's voting capital;
(c) gives the acquiring enterprise "majority ownership" within the meaning of §16
(1) of the Stock Corporation Act. 79
31, 1973. at 25 (commenary on U.N. study of multinational business); and I U.S. Department of
Commerce, The Multinational Corporation, at 3-7 (1972). In November, 1973, the EEC
Commission submitted to the Council of Ministers a series of proposals for the control of the
"undesirable" activities of multinational corporations. Among the proposals was a repetition of the
EEC merger control regulation discussed below. "A key objective of the commission's paper is to
speed government action on a number of proposals it made as many as three years ago. By putting
these proposals in the context of multinational activities, a political issue in many countries, officials
hope they will gain more rapid acceptance." International Herald-Tribune, Nov. 7, 1973, at 9.
7 8Divo INSTITUTE FOR EcONOMic RESEARCH, AMERICAN SUBSIDIARIES IN GERMANY, 176-180
(CCH 1969).
79GWB § 23 (2) (2), as amended, also now includes certain "attribution of ownership" rules (e.g.,
the private share holdings of a sole proprietor who is an entrepreneur are to be included in making
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(3) Agreements with another enterprise through which:
(a) an affiliated group ("Konzern") within the meaning of §18 of the Stock
Corporation Act is created or expanded; 80
(b) the other enterprise obligates itself to turn its profits over to the acquiring
enterprise or to conduct its business for the account of the acquiring enterprise;
or
(c) the business of the other enterprise is completely or in significant part used or
managed by the acquiring enterprise.
(4) The creation of "interlocking" supervisory boards, management boards, or similar
corporate boards of directors, where an identity of one-half (1/2) or more of the
members is created.
In addition to these specifically mentioned types of concentration, the definition
of merger now also concludes with a "fail-safe" clause to sweep in the creation
of "every other connection or relation of enterprises, through which one or more
enterprises can directly or indirectly exercise a dominating influence on another
enterprise." Obviously the authority of the Cartel Office to supervise mergers
and other forms of inter-enterprise cooperation under this fail-safe clause is very
great which is exactly what the legislator intended it to be. 8 1
It is important to observe that the new definition even covers joint ventures
and the other "simultaneous or sequential acquisition of stock in another
enterprise by several otherwise unrelated enterprises." 82 The scope of the new
definition of merger in this respect has been astonishing, even to German jurists
conversant with the anti-trust law field.
2. FILING OF A MERGER
Under Section 23 of the amended Act, mergers must be immediately reported
to the Federal Cartel Office if:
these calculations, as well as the holdings of "controlled" or "controlling" enterprises) and the
"joint enterprise" provision, mentioned below. Regarding § 16 (1) of the Stock Corporation Act, see
JUENGER & SCHMIDT, GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (English trans.) § 16 (1) (CCH 1967),
and the discussions of the uniquely German body of law dealing with Konzernrecht found in
Haskell, The New West German Law of "Related Business Units, " THE BuSINEss LAWYER 421
(1969). and Bringezu, Parent-Subsidiary Relations under German Law, 7 THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER 138 (1973).
"
0Regarding § 18 of the Stock Corporation Act, see JUENGER & SCHMIDT, supra note 79. at § 18.
"See Report of Economic Committee on the Bill for the Second Amending Act to the Act Against
Restraints of Competition, June 13, 1973 (Bericht des Ausschusses fur Wirtschaft),
BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 7/765. reprinted in (1973) WuW 581 (August, 1973), at 589:
The Committee dealt especially thoroughly with the comprehensive scope of Subsection 2 (5) (of
Section 23) .. .As a result of the (statutory) change, it is intended to be guaranteed that the
establishment of indirect power of control through mutually coordinated commitments, a stock
voting agreement. for example, can also be dealt with as "concentrations." The Committee was
unanimous that (this provision) will thus encompass factual as well as formal legal relationships.
It avoided an exclusively express delineation (of the types of relationships covered), in order not to
open possibilities for avoidance of (the statutory provision) through (the cataloguing of) forms of
agreements between enterprises.
For a good discussion of the new definition of "concentration," see Wiirdinger, Arten und Formen
der Ut,,rnehmenszusannmenschlsse i. S. der neuen §§ 23 bis 24 GWB, (1973) WuW 731 (Nov.
1973).
"GWB § 23 (2) (2), as amended. Certain exceptions to this rule are applicable to banks, in
particular with respect to their underwriting activities. See GWB § 23 (3), as amended.
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(1) within the total territorial jurisdiction of this Act or within a significant part
thereof, a market share of 20 percent is reached or increased as a result of the merger,
or if one of the participating enterprises has a market share of 20 percent of another
market, or
(2) the participating enterprise taken together at any particular time in the last fiscal
year preceding the merger employed at least 10,000 persons or during that time period
had sales of at least DM 500 million.
This "filing" is essentially a simple registration requirement, designed to
provide the Cartel Office with the background information necessary for it to
carry out its supervisory functions over market-dominating enterprises and,
since the 1973 Amending Act, its injunctory powers over prohibited mergers. By
filing, of course, an enterprise immediately "red flags" itself for special
surveillance.
The filing must include precise data as to such tests which under the Act
require the filing, including the bases for estimates which may be made, if any.
Incorrect statements are subject to fines. 83 Notice of the filing of a merger with
the Cartel Office is to be published in the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger);
such publication is also an innovation of the 1973 amendments.
84
It will be noted that the market-percentage test of the filing requirement
clearly refers to the German market. This is unclear with respect to the tests
regarding the number of employees or annual sales of an enterprise. The better
view appears to be that these tests too refer only to employees in Germany and
sales in Germany. 85 The issue is, however, unsettled.
83GWB § 23 (5) & (6), as amended; GWB § 38 (1) (7), as amended.
GWB § 10 (1) (5), as amended. Certain special provisions regarding the filing requirement are
included for making the applicable determinations for banks and insurance companies and for
dealing with the issues involved in their portfolio ownership of securities. See GWB § 23 (1) (2), as
amended.
"'See KLAUE, UNTERNEHMENSZUSAMMENSCHLUSSE NACH & 23 DES GESETZES GEGEN
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN MIT UND ZWISCHEN AUSLXNDISCHEN UNTERNEHMEN (limited
printing of doctorial dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law and Economics of the University
of Mainz, 1967). Unfortunately, despite the very practical importance of the issues to foreign
enterprises, the questions of what employees and what sales of multinational corporations are to be
considered in determining whether a filing obligation exists have not been dealt with authoritatively.
Klaue's dissertation is the most extensive discussion of the issues presently available.
The tests regarding the number of employees or annual sales were first introduced into the GWB
by the 1965 amending act. Klaue analyzes their scope in light of § 98 (2) GWB, which defines the
limits of the extraterritorial applications of the Act. That section reads:
This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition which have effects in the area in which this
Act applies, even if they result from acts done outside this area.
Klaue's carefully reasoned conclusion, that the employee and sales tests must apply only to
employees or sales within Germany, is supported by the legislative history of these tests, which
indicates that they were introduced as secondary "assistance criteria" for the market-share test. As
such, Klaue reasons, they in themselves lack the weight, necessary under the jurisdictional concepts
of private international law, to subject foreign enterprises to the filing requirement.
For a contrary conclusion, see Ebel, Novellierung des Gesetzes Regen Wettbewerbsbeschr'n-
kungen (pt. 2), (1973) NEUE JURIsTIscHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1666 (Sept. 18, 1973), at 1666.
See also Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Limits Imposed by International Law on the Application of
Cartel Law, S THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 279 (1971).
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3. PROHIBITION OF MERGERS
Under the terms of the amended Kartellgesetz, the Federal Cartel Office
must now prohibit a merger which can be expected to create or strengthen a
market-dominating position86 unless the participating enterprises can prove
that:
(1) the merger will improve competition, and
(2) such improvements in competition outweigh the disadvantages of
market-domination.
No order prohibiting or enjoining a merger may be issued by the Cartel Office
after the expiration of one year after the date of a complete and full filing. 87
The only other exception from the basic prohibition of mergers which create
or strengthen market-dominating positions may be granted by the Federal
Minister of Economics for mergers where the negative effects on competition
will be outweighed by general economic advantages or can be justified by "a
paramount public good," giving due consideration to the structure of the
market outside of Germany. 88 This provision is clearly a compromise with those
political forces which regarded the new German merger control provisions as
being too restrictive. The examples that have usually been mentioned in
connection with permission for a merger under this exception relate to the
maintenance of the general level of employment, the protection of key
industries, and the encouragement of domestic firms that must compete in the
world market. It can easily be seen, however, that this "public interest" test
leaves the Economics Minister with a good deal of discretion in approving or
disapproving mergers.
"1GWB § 24 (1) & (2), as amended.
I GWB § 24 (2), as amended.
"GWB § 24 (3), as amended. There is a certain amount of irony in the fact that one of the first
major merger proposals to be prohibited by the Federal Cartel Office (and probably one of the first
which will be subsequently granted an exception by the Federal Minister of Economics) was one
proposed by the German Federal Government itself! For some time--since well before the
beginning of the present "oil crisis"-the German government has been interested in creating a
major German-controlled oil company. The government had achieved control of one substantial
company, Veba AG, and intended to purchase the controlling interest of another, Gelsenber$ AG,
after which it planned to merge the two firms, thereby creating the desired major company. In
compliance with the new merger control provisions, the parties to the plan, including the Federal
Finance Ministry, submitted it to the Cartel Office for clearance. On January 8, 1974, the Cartel
Office announced that it found it necessary to prohibit the proposed merger, since it would create a
market-dominating position and since the proponents of the plan had failed to show competitive
improvements which outweighed the disadvantages of creation of that position. In its
communication to the plan's participants, the Cartel Office made reference to the possibility of their
application for an exemption by the Economics Minister. In all likelihood such an application will
be made and an exemption will be granted. (The Economics Minister's personal view of the
proposal is presumedly reflected by the belief that he was to have become chairman of the
supervisory board of Gelsenberg AG after acquisition of it by the Governmentl) See Gelsenberg:
Bonn gibt sich selbst den Segen, Handelsblatt, Jan. 9, 1974, at 1. See also Mundorf, Veto aus
Berlin, id., at 3.
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4. ADVANCE CLEARING OF MERGER PROPOSALS
A merger proposal may always be submitted for clearance with the Federal
Cartel Office and must be so submitted if at least two of the parties thereto each
had annual sales during their last fiscal years of DM 1 billion or more.89 Such
submission sets into motion certain relatively short (one to four months)
deadlines for action on the proposal by the Cartel Office, during which time it
must either approve or disapprove the proposed merger. 90 Submission then
serves to estop the Office from later attempting to enjoin a completed
transaction. (Submission does not, however, modify the "filing" requirement
under Section 23, which, of course, exists for a different purpose, that of
supervising existing market-dominating entities.)
It should be noted that the deadlines set for Cartel Office action on a
submission may be extended with the consent of the parties requesting the
clearance and that informal requests from the Office for such extensions are
expected to be common, especially in the near future, since the Office is not yet
adequately staffed to deal with the number of clearance requests expected. 9 1 In
order to obtain a desired clearance, firms participating in a proposed merger
should be prepared for careful consultations with the Cartel Office's staff, in
order to convince the Office that the statutory prerequisites for allowing the
merger exist. Since the burden of proof is on the parties requesting the
clearance, it can be expected that the Office will be inclined to deny such
clearance in any doubtful case.
5. "DE MINIMIS" MERGER EXEMPTIONS
The amended Act includes an important clause exempting certain types of
mergers, regarded as de minimis, from the prohibition. Thereunder a merger is
exempt if:
(1) the total annual sales of the merging enterprises during their last fiscal year was less
than DM 500 million;
(2) an enterprise with annual sales of no more than DM 50 million is acquired by
another enterprise;
(3) only a regional part of the German market is affected by the market-domination;
or
(4) the relevant market for goods or services in the last calendar year had sales of only
DM 10 million. 92
The lawyer who discovers that his particular merger problem involves one of
these fact situations can thus safely proceed with the proposal without having to
try to unravel the Gordian knots of the merger definition and "market-
"GWB § 24a (1), as amended.
'
0GWB § 24a (2), as amended.
"Kartellnovelle: Dem Hammerfehlt der Stiel, Handelsblatt, Aug. 6, 1973, at 1.
"GWB § 24 (8), as amended.
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domination"-probably much to his relief and that of his client. The knots,
however, will remain, as the supervisory power of the Cartel Office grows.
V. Some Other Changes In the Kartengesetz
Before concluding our discussion of the revision of the Kartellgesetz, two (for
foreign enterprises) relatively minor provisions of the 1973 Amending Act still
deserve some mention.
A. Cooperation between Small Enterprises
The major exceptions from the Act's Section 1 prohibition against horizontal
agreements restraining competition numerically have been Section 5's
exemption for "rationalization cartels" and Section 5a's exemption for
"specialization cartels." 93 Both of these types of cartel agreements are
permitted by the statute on the theory that the increases in productivity and
efficiency and the consequent improvements in the satisfaction of consumer
demand resulting from their existence outweigh the adverse consequences of
restricted competition. "Rationalization cartels" include agreements to
"regulate" markets with erratic demand patterns, especially agricultural
markets dealing in perishable products. "Specialization cartels," a particular
species of rationalization cartels, involve agreements between independent firms
under which individual firms each produce only a part of a product line and
then sell through a common marketing system. Under the exceptions to Section
1, the Cartel Office is empowered to permit outright price fixing and joint
selling and purchasing arrangements but it must also give its prior approval to
such rationalization and specialization cartels and thereby affirm that the
specific agreement involved meets the above-mentioned theoretical test. 94
According to Cartel Office critics, the Office tended to interpret the enabling
language of Sections 5 and 5a too narrovfly and therefore strike down proposed
agreements which, again according to such critics, were within the spirit and
intent of the Sections to encourage desirable cooperation between smaller firms,
in order for them to meet competition from large enterprises. 95
As a consequence of this criticism, the 1973 Amending Act introduced into
the Kartellgesetz a new Section 5b, designed to facilitate cooperation between
small and medium-sized enterprises, for the purpose of increasing their general
economic efficiency. 96 The new Section provides as follows:
'
3GWB § Sa, added to the Act in 1965 to permit specialization agreements under less stringent
conditions than they had formerly been subjected to under § 5.
'See generally 6 MiLLER-HENNEBERG AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at cases annotating §§ 5
and 5a.
9'Poeche, supra note 68, at 24.
"The intent stated in the government's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 55, at 545.
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Section 1 does not apply to agreements and decisions, the object of which is the
rationalization of economic processes thrQvgh a method other than that designated in
Section 5a (i.e., other than through specialization) having inter-enterprise cooperation
as its object, provided that market competition is not thereby significantly adversely
affected and the agreement or decisions serves to promote the general economic
efficiency of small or middle-sized enterprises.
As with rationalization agreements, agreements under Section 5b must be
reported to the Cartel Office and take effect three months after such filing,
unless the Office specifically objects thereto on the grounds that the particular
agreement does not meet the conditions of the exemption. 97 Areas of
cooperation expected to be covered by the new exemption include common
advertising efforts, joint purchasing and sales activities, and the exchange of
certain types of market information. The practical significance of the exemption
is, of course, yet to be determined, particularly in view of its limitation to small
and medium-sized enterprises and in view of the new prohibition of concerted
practices.
B. Establishment of a Monopoly Commission
The second "minor" addition to the Kartellgesetz resulting from the 1973
Amending Act and deserving some mention here is the authorization of the
establishment of a "Monopoly Commission." 98 During the stage when various
proposals for the legislation which eventually resulted in the 1973 Amending
Act were being debated, it was widely suggested that the Monopoly
Commission, instead of the Federal Cartel Office or the Ministry of Economics,
be given jurisdiction over the merger control provisions of the revised Act.
Advocates of this proposal had expressed the view that an "independent
agency" would be a more impartial supervisor of the merger provisions than the
"more politically sensitive" Office or Ministry. The statutory role for the
Commission that emerged in the 1973 Amending Act was thus a compromise
between the advocates of this position and those who wished to keep jurisdiction
in the hands of the traditional authorities. The Commission is charged with the
task of the "regular examination of the development of concentration of
enterprises in the Federal Republic of Germany and the application of [the
Act's provisions dealing with market-dominating enterprises and merger
control]." The Federal Government may request the Commission to undertake
special studies of particular concentration problems and the Federal Minister of
Economics may also seek the Commission's advice regarding his powers to
authorize individual mergers, which are otherwise prohibited, on grounds of
"the public interest." A complete report on concentration activities, including
"GWB § 5b (2) and (3).
981973 Amend. Act, Art. 1 (9), now GWB § 24b.
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possible recommendations for legislative changes, is to be issued by the
Commission every two years.
The Commission itself is composed of five members; the statute also
authorizes the organization of a Commission staff. The Commission is an
independent agency, not under the supervision of the Federal Cartel Office or
any of the regular government ministries and responsible primarily for its
biennial report. Because of the professional qualifications for membership on
the Commission specified by the statute and the stipulated requirement that
Commission members be free from direct government, union or trade
association affiliations, the initial appointments to the Commission required a
relatively thorough personnel search. 99 While it will obviously require some
time yet before the new Commission and its staff become functioning parts of
the German anti-trust control system, it is hoped that the Commission's reports
and recommendations will play a significant independent role in future policy
decisions, particularly at the legislative level.
VT. The Kartellgesetz in a European Context
The Kartellgesetz, along with the other German legislation dealing with
economic competition, attempts, through its various rules and regulatory
authorizations, to establish within the Federal Republic of Germany a legal
structure which enables the theoretically proper functioning of a modified free
enterprise system. To this point, we have viewed that structure primarily from
the standpoint of the internal German economy only. Germany today, however,
is increasingly a part of a larger economic and political whole, made up of the
European Economic Community. As such, an examination of the Kartellgesetz
alone, without reference to the competition rules of the Community, makes
almost as little sense as an examination of the unfair trade practices laws of New
York State alone, without reference to American Federal legislation. Before
turning to recent developments in the area of EEC regulation, it is probably
worthwhile to raise a few questions (even if without attempting to answer them)
"'See Bonn sucht noch zwei "Monopolkommissare, " Handelsblatt, Aug. 23, 1973, at 1, and
Monopolkommission bald einsatzbereit, Handelsblatt, Nov. 2, 1973, at 5. The initial appointees to
the Commission have generally received a favorable public reaction, despite the fact that the
majority of the Commission is thought to lean towards an "anti-merger" attitude. The five
appointees are: (1) Economist Erhard Kantzenbach, President of the University of Frankfurt,
author of a leading economic study of competition (Die Funktionsfhigkeit des Wettbewerbs, 1966);
(2) Law Professor Ernst-Joachim Mestmadcker, former Rector of the University of Bielefeld, a
specialist in the field of legal regulation of the economy and author of a new (1973) commentary on
European competition law, Europaisches Wettbewerbsrecht, of which an English edition is being
planned; (3) Dieter Fertsch-Rover, a Frankfurt businessman who has served as chairman of the
highly reputable Arbeitsgemeinschaft selbst'dndiger Unternehmer (Society of Independent
Businessmen); (4) Erich Mittelsten Scheid, a manufacturer whose views are expected to mirror
those of the German industrial community; and (5) Josef Murawski, the labor relations director for
a major steel concern, whose views are expected to be representative of theGerman labor unions.
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about the present-day significance of the German legislation within the larger
European context.
The competition policies of the several EEC member States vary widely,
ranging from the relatively free enterprise approaches of Germany and Great
Britain to the state-owned, monopoly enterprise approach of Italy. Public
opinion in Europe, even within each member State of the Community, is sharply
divided over the virtue of economic competition. While it is probably true "that
economically the Rome Treaty is basically a Treaty for more competition', 1
the EEC regulations themselves jurisdictionally can affect only the larger,
European-wide enterprises and the Community policy of promoting enterprises
large enough to compete on a continental basis, and thereby meet the
"American challenge," 101 can frequently be in conflict with the other
Community policy of promoting competition. Because of the various degrees of
market monopoly within national markets, the problem of delineating the
relevant market for the application of anti-trust rules is a difficult one under
both the EEC rules and the German statute.
It is this problem that critics of the stricter German rules most frequently
raise when questioning the efficacy of the Kartellgesetz: how meaningful can
the German concepts of market-domination and merger control be, when the
German enterprises which are restricted thereby must meet competition from,
for example, an Italian monopoly that is not restricted by any anti-trust
legislation?
Beyond the complex issue of achieving legislative harmony between the
member States lies the even more complex issue of achieving a sociological
harmony between the differing attitudes of the peoples of those States towards
comparable legislative prescriptions. In this regard the analogy of "tax
morality" comes quickly to mind: in northern Europe a statutory tax rate of 50
percent means, pretty much, 50 percent; in southern Europe a 50 percent
statutory rate can frequently mean only a 25 percent effective rate. In the area of
anti-trust regulation only the most primitive steps have been taken toward
legislative harmonization of the national anti-trust laws of the member States
and the issue of harmonizing attitudes towards legislative policies for the
encouragement of economic competition has hardly been considered at all.
Under such circumstances, ask the critics of the Kartellgesetz and its 1973
amendments, what is the economic purpose in increasing the regulatory power
of the Federal Cartel Office? Why should German business enterprises be
limited in their ability to dominate their domestic markets when, on a European
1°0Mussard, The Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Under the Common Market Treaty
(INT'L & COMP. L.Q. Supp. No. 4, 1962), 17.
"'For a discussion of efforts to encourage the organization of continential-wide business
enterprises through "legal harmonization," see STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY
LAWS (1971).
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scale, their competitors are free to establish captive domestic bases, which
enable them better to compete on the European and world markets? The
answers to these questions will determine the future of the German
Marktwirtschaft. The questions themselves also help to explain the keen
interest of German economic and legal scholars in the progress of developing an
effective European system of anti-trust law.
VII. Recent Merger Control Activities
by EEC Institutions
A. The Europemballage Case
The control of mergers has not interested the German government alone. It
has also received increasing attentions from the Commission of the European
Communities, in its capacity as administrator of the EEC's anti-trust rules, and
from the European Court of Justice, the Communities' judicial arm. 102 Most
noteworthy have been the efforts of the Commission to breathe life into Article
86 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits taking improper advantage of a
dominant position within the Common Market or a substantial part thereof.
With somewhat strained reliance on the language of this Article, the
Commission has developed an "abuse-aimed merger" theory, which holds that
it is an abuse of a market-dominating position if an enterprise creates or
increases a dominant position by acquiring another enterprise. 103
This abuse-aimed merger theory recently received significant support from
the European Court of Justice in the widely-reported action by the Commission
against Europemballage, the European holdings subsidiary of Continental Can
Corporation. In 1969 Europemballage took control of the German container
firm Schmalbach Lubeca Werke AG, which in turn, in 1970, took over the
Dutch company Thomassen en Drijver Verblifa N.V. Continental Can's
licensees also had significant portions of the packaging markets in France and
Italy. The Commission took the position that the 1970 Dutch take-over was an
abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market and therefore a violation
of Article 86.104
'
2The literature now available in English on EEC competition policy and its enforcement is
voluminous. For a brief overview the reader is referred to either Zaphiriou, European Anti-Trust
Law, in EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW (Sweet & Maxwell 1970) or Dietz, Enforcement of Anti-Trust
Laws in the EEC, 6 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 742 (1972). Lengthier studies are RAHL, COMMON
MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST (1970) and DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (CCH 1968). A brief discussion of the administration of EEC
competition law is Graupner, Commission Decision-Making on Competition Questions, 10
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 291 (Aug. 1973). On the judicial aspects of the enforcement of
EEC law generally, see BRINKHORST & SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1969).
10 3The "abuse-aimed merger" theory was first articulated by the Commission in 1966. See EEC
Commission, Concentration of Firms in the Common Market (Information Memorandum No.
P-1/66), reprinted in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9081 (1966).
"'For a summary of the Commission's statement of its views on the Europemballage situation,
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When oral presentations were made before the Court of Justice in November,
1972, the Court's Advocate General, whose opinion is frequently determinative,
in what appeared to be a major defeat for the Commission, adopted the
essential theoretical positions of Continental Can and argued against the
doctrinal soundness of the abuse-aimed merger theory:
It... follows from Article 86 that the Treaty tolerates even the absence of all
competition, i.e., a complete monopoly. This may be said, in my opinion, since Article
86 obviously does not distinguish between different degrees of market domination and
since it does not, like section 2 of the Sherman Act, which was perfectly familiar to the
authors of the Treaty, declare the very attempt to create a monopoly situation
prohibited. Moreover, it is significant that Article 86, unlike Article 66 of the
[European Coal and Steel Community] Treaty and Article 85 (3) (b) of the EEC Treaty,
precisely does not contain the reservation that "genuine competition" should not be
prevented (Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty) or that there should be no opportunity to
eliminate competition in respect of a considerable part of the products in question
(Article 85 (3) (b) of the EEC Treaty) .... Consequently, the challenged decision must
be annulled on the ground that it has no legal basis in Article 86 of the Treaty. 105
Secondarily, the Advocate General contended that the Commission had further
failed to prove that Continental Can (through Europemballage and Schmalbach
Lubeca) held a market-dominating position.
The Court announced its ruling in the case on February 21, 1973.106 In a
judgment of great importance for the constitutional law-making powers of the
Court itself (and one reminiscent of the judicial approach of Chief Justice John
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison), it held that, from the facts regarding market
structure and shares used by the Commission as the grounds for its conclusion,
the Commission was in error in concluding that Continental Can dominated its
market. In accepting the Advocate General's secondary argument, the Court
annulled the Commission's decision against Continental Can and Europembal-
lage. More significantly, however, the Court then went on to accept the doctrine
of the abuse-aimed merger:
To resolve this problem [of the applicability of Article 86 to mergers] it is necessary to
resort to the spirit, structure and working of Article 86 and to the system and aims of
the Treaty.... In the absence of express provisions, it cannot be supposed that the
Treaty, which in Article 85 prohibits certain decisions of normal associations of
undertakings restricting but not eliminating competition, intended in Article 86 to
permit undertakings, by merging into an organic unit, to obtain such a dominant
see " 'Continental Can' Will Be Invited to Give Up Control of the Dutch Firm 'Verblifa' by the
European Commission," Europe, March 15, 1971. Continental Can's response to that position is
summarized in " 'Europemballages' Does Not Share the Commission's Views on Its Claimed Abuse
of a Dominating Position on the Market," Europe, March 25, 1971.
'
0 Submissions of the Advocate-General (Herr Karl Roemer), reported in Europemballage
Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. E.C. Commission (case No. 6/72), (1973)
COMM. MKT. L.R. (Part 68) 199, at 202 (April 1973); 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8171.
'
06Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. E. C. Commission
(European Ct. of Justice Judgement of Feb. 21, 1973), supra note 105, at 219. See Case Note, 10
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 316 (Aug. 1973).
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position that any serious possibility of competition is almost eliminated .... There
may therefore be abusive behaviour if an undertaking in a dominant position
strengthens that dominant position so that the degree of control achieved substantially
obstructs competition, i.e.. so that the only undertakings left in the market are those
which are dependent on the dominant undertaking with regard to their market
behaviour.
Article 86 has thus been established as an instrument for at least the partial
control of market-dominating mergers.
B. Proposed EEC Regulation for
the Control of Mergers
Based on the authority which it finds in Article 86, supplemented by the
"enabling" and "purpose" provisions of Articles 87, 235 and 3(f), the
Commission announced on July 18, 1973, that it had completed preparation of a
draft Council Regulation for the systematic control of mergers in the Common
Market. 107 The draft is being reviewed at the time of this writing by the
European Parliament, which must indicate its consent, and also by a study
committee established by the Council of Ministers. It will then be considered by
the Council of Ministers itself, which has ultimate authority over the
promulgation of such Regulations. 10 8 The Commission had expressed the hope
that this legislative process could be completed in time for the Regulation to
become effective on January 1, 1975, a hope which now appears unlikely to be
fulfilled. Although it clearly does not yet constitute law, the proposed
Regulation is of interest to German businesses and to foreign enterprises doing
business in Germany, particularly in view of the recent German developments in
the field of merger control.
The proposed EEC Regulation exhibits clearly the influence of the German
Kartellgesetz in its 1973 amended form. The Regulation's basic provision,
found in its Article 1, provides that:
Any transaction which has the direct or indirect effect of bringing about a
concentration between undertakings or groups of undertakings, at least one of which is
established in the Common Market, whereby they acquire or enhance the power to
hinder effective competition in the Common Market or in a substantial part thereof, is
incompatible with the Common Market insofar as the concentration may affect trade
between member-States. The power to hinder effective competition shall be appraised
by reference in particular to the extent to which suppliers and consumers have a
possibility of choice, to the economic and financial power of the undertakings
concerned, to the structure of the markets affected, and to supply and demand trends
for the relevant goods or services.
"'Draft Regulation of the E.C. Council Concerning Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, EEC Comm'n Doc. Com. (73) 1210 final (18 July 1973), (1973) Comm. Mkt. L.R.
D205 (Sept. 1973); 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 19586 (hereinafter cited as Draft Reg.).
"°'This is in essence the usual legislative process for the adoption of "Community law." For a brief
description of the process, see NOdL, How THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY'S INSTITUTIONS
WORK (Community Topics 27, European Community Information Service 1968).
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The jurisdictional prerequisites provided in this basic provision, that at least
one EEC enterprise be involved and that trade between member States be
affected, are the normal ones for this type of EEC Regulation. In cases where
these prerequisites are met and where a prohibited merger is contemplated or
occurs, the Commission is granted power to enjoin or to order divestiture of the
concentration. 1 0 9
Otherwise prohibited mergers may be exempted from the application of the
Regulation by the Commission, if they are determined to be "indispensable to
the attainment of an objective which is given priority treatment in the common
interest of the Community." 110 The similarity of this provision to that in the
amended Kartellgesetz which grants exemption power to the Federal Minister
of Economics in "public interest" cases is clear. Also like the German Act is the
de minimis exemptions provision of the proposed Regulation, exempting
mergers in which the participating enterprises have combined annual sales of
less than 200 million EEC units of account1 11 (presently approximately 240
million) and less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the relevant market in any
member State.
"Concentration" is broadly defined. It includes any acquisition of "control"
of another firm which permits the acquiring enterprise to determine how the
acquired enterprise shall be managed. 112 "Hindrance of competition," the
proposed Regulation's other key phrase, as can be seen from the foregoing
quotation of its Article 1, is also not precisely defined. Both terms leave the
Commission-and the Court of Justice-with substantial discretion over which
combinations of enterprises to exert the prohibitory authority proposed to be
granted.
The proposal, again parallel to the revised Kartellgesetz, calls for the prior
notification of certain large mergers to the Commission. 113 Mergers falling into
this category are those which involve enterprises having combined annual sales
of 1 billion EEC units of account (presently approximately $1.2 billion),
including all sales of parent and subsidiary companies. Following notification of
the proposed merger, the participating enterprises must then wait a period of
three months for its consummation, during which time the Commission may
take action against it. 114 If the Commission takes no action during this waiting
0 9
'Draft Reg., Art. 3, especially para. 3:
Where a concentration has already been put into effect, the Commission may require, by decision
taken under paragraph 1 or by a separate decision, the undertakings, or assets acquired or con-
centrated to be separated or the cessation of common control or any other action that may be
appropriate in order to restore conditions of effective competition.
"'Draft Reg., Art. 1, para. 3.
'"One EEC unit of account is presently equivalent to the value of 0.88867088 grams of fine gold,
or the gold value of the U.S. dollar in 1958. See Budget Regulation of the Community of July 30,
1968, Art. 17 (I), (1968) Official Gazette L 199.
"'Draft Reg., Art. 2.
"'Draft Reg., Art. 4, para. 1.
"Draft Reg., Art. 7.
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period, the proposed merger may be regarded as approved: Another de minimis
merger provision exempts from the prior notification requirement those mergers
which involve the take-over by billion unit-of-account enterprises of enterprises
with annual sales of less than 30 million units of account. 115 Such take-overs,
however, still remain subject to the general prohibition against "competition-
hindering" mergers of the proposed Regulation's Article 1.
Since German industry is already subject to similar, and stricter, anti-trust
handicaps, the proposed EEC Regulation does not meet with strong objections
in the Federal Republic. While the thought of additional regulation is not, of
course, in itself appealing, the possibility that the new EEC rules will be a first
step toward equalizing anti-trust regulatory burdens between business
enterprises in the Common Market is welcomed by many German business and
legal observers. The proposal has been received in Italy and, to a lesser degree,
in France, on the other hand, by relatively strong opposition. Neither of the
latter two countries have comparable anti-trust legislation. Great Britain, also
having monopoly legislation, has an attitude towards the proposal similar to
that prevailing in Germany. It is clear that the proposed Regulation will face
substantial opposition before it takes effect as law, and then only after much
debate and amendment. In the course of that debate, the balance of continental
Europe will undoubtedly be learning a good deal about anti-trust policy from
the German experience.
"'Draft Reg., Art. 4, para. 2.
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